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Introduction 
Throughout history, we have seen critical moments that defined an individual, group, 
business or organization. For the most part, British Petroleum was defined by their reaction to 
the gulf coast oil spills, Tiger Woods’s success on the golf course has been overshadowed by his 
personal issues, and the Duke Lacrosse team’s championship run was canceled because of a 
sexual assault accusation. These are just a snapshot of major crises that we can (and will) 
examine in this text. Despite the notoriety of these cases, these crises are what form a major part 
of the public perception of these entities to date.  
After examining the literature, this text defines a crisis as an event which requires action 
and a strategic response. These events (crises) threaten the public’s impression of an organization 
or individual. While some small crises may go unnoticed due to effective communication, others 
can call for the world’s attention. In either scenario, careful evaluation and consideration must go 
into the response. Factors such as the events that lead to the crisis, the publics or stakeholders 
that are following the situation, and the organization’s reputation are just examples of 
perspectives that need to be considered. A well-crafted response may not only minimize the 
damage to an organization’s reputation, but even remove an organization’s connection to the 
crisis. 
Crisis is by no means limited to those of fame and fortune. Even within Iowa State 
University, recent history has seen responses to local shootings both internal and external to the 
school, University affiliated riots (VEISHEA) and legality issues (most recently with the usage 
of the University airplanes). Athletics has seen issues of player confrontations with the law. The 
University has even become involved with student organizations regarding trademark issues. In 
2017 the University ultimately lost a battle with the National Organization for the Reform of 
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Marijuana Laws (NORML) club on campus regarding the use of ‘Cy’ and a marijuana leaf. The 
difference is that these programs (Iowa State University and Cyclone Athletics) have 
departments that oversee the legality and public image of the company or organization.  
Many of the traditional student organizations on campus do not have this luxury, so when 
crisis hits, it can be devastating to the existence of the group. For example, in 2012 the hockey 
team made the front page of the Iowa State Daily for all the wrong reasons. One of the team’s 
rookie forwards was arrested for public intoxication. What made it front-page worthy was the 
player also happened to be an Ames native. Due to other past issues with the program, the future 
of one of the University’s top student organizations was put in jeopardy. Instead of attempting to 
help restore the image of the program and help the team through the difficult time, the university 
put the program under a microscope. These situations should not be taken as a moment to shame 
an entity, but rather to help educate, guide and restore.  
This project will provide a theoretical basis for the decision-making process before 
reviewing and analyzing three cases that possess various levels of threat to an organization’s 
reputation. The purpose is to provide an understanding and plan for student organizations to 
follow in the event of a crisis. The final sections of this text will outline three scenarios of 
various threat levels, and a guide for how to respond to each.  
Crisis is inevitable. It is what generates the plot of the movies we watch, the stories we 
read and even the news that we see in our day. A response should not be a matter of who can 
afford the best representation, it should be a matter of education and preparation, a goal that this 
text seeks to achieve. 
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Literature Review 
Crisis communication is important as it can drastically diminish harm to an organization 
if managed properly, or significantly increase the harm if mishandled (Benson, 1988). The field 
of crisis communication has been largely filled with case studies to provide a precedent for 
future crisis response while attempting to answer the demand for theory and empirical research 
on internal crisis communication (eg. Frandsen & Johansen, 2011; Johansen, Aggerholm, & 
Frandsen, 2012; Taylor, 2010). Crisis management can be broken into the three different time 
frames of pre-crisis, crisis response, and post-crisis (Coombs, 2007a, 2009). Each stage of crisis 
management has been linked to a different type of crisis communication approach. Risk 
communication has seen strong affiliation with pre-crisis stage (Palenchar & Heath, 2002, 2007) 
and renewal discourse with post-crisis (Seeger, Ulmer, & Sellnow 2005; Ulmer, Seeger, & 
Sellnow, 2007) (Mazzei & Ravazzani, 2015). Crisis communication in this text is primarily 
concerned with timing of crisis response, as words and actions are most critical at that point 
(Coombs, 2007a) and the transition to post-crisis. Situation Crisis Communication Theory 
(SCCT) was developed to provide an evidence-based understanding to evaluate a proper internal 
crisis response when factoring in the stakeholders and reputational protection of the organization. 
A minimal approach to a crisis would evaluate if an organization was responsible for the events, 
consider the reputation of the organization and then formulate a response to signify the desired 
intention. SCCT evaluates how factors such as crisis response strategies, emotions, crisis history 
and prior relationship reputation impact each of the stages (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Situation Crisis Communication Theory Model (Coombs, 2007b) 
 
By evaluating the factors above, a crisis manager can use this model to develop a response 
that takes an approach of denial, diminish, or rebuild to convey the desired level of crisis 
responsibility to the stakeholders (Coombs, 2006; Coombs and Holladay, 2004, 2005). SCCT 
provides a clear framework to consider when evaluating the proposed cases for review and in 
providing further recommendations for other cases. 
An additional framework to use when evaluating SCCT is Attribution Theory. Attribution 
Theory provides a strong consideration regarding judgments people make. This is determined by 
evaluating locus, stability and controllability. Locus determines if the cause of the crisis is 
internal or external to the organization. Stability refers to if the cause of the crisis is continuously 
present or if the level of the threat varies over time. Controllability evaluates if the organization 
can affect the cause of the crisis or not (Russell, 1982; Wilson, Cruz, Marshall, & Rao, 1993). 
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Attribution Theory can therefore be used to help determine the initial crisis responsibility and 
strategies in SCCT.  
In the research of Coombs, he suggests that the use of Attribution Theory can help to 
categorize response to crisis situations. He provides two main contributions to consider. First, he 
categorized crisis-response strategies by eliminating redundant strategies and grouping strategies 
into the larger categories as outlined by Table 1 (Coombs, 1995). This helps to provide an 
organized approach to consider response strategies.  A complete explanation of each strategy can 
be found in Appendix I. 
Nonexistence Strategies 
1. Denial 
2. Clarification 
3. Attack 
4. Intimidation 
 
 
Distance Strategies 
1. Excuse 
a. Denial of intention 
b. Denial of volition 
2. Justification 
a. Minimizing injury 
b. Victim Deserving 
c. Misrepresentation of the crisis event 
 
Ingratiation Strategies 
1. Bolstering 
2. Transcendence 
3. Praising Others 
 
Mortification Strategies 
1. Remediation 
2. Repentance 
3. Rectification 
 
Suffering Strategy 
Table 1-Coombs Crisis-Response Strategies (Coombs, 1995) 
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 Coombs’ second contribution comes in the form of the Crisis Type Matrix. This matrix 
seeks to classify the perception of the crisis based on Attribution Theory with two dimensions. 
The first he outlines is locus as it is a key supporter to the approach of crisis management. 
According to Coombs (1995), the second he states, “must be orthogonal so that when the 
dimensions are crossed, mutually exclusive crisis types are found” (page 8). From this he 
proposes the intentional versus unintentional dimensions. Table 2 shows Coombs’ proposed 
Crisis Type Matrix. 
 
Table 2: Coombs Crisis Type Matrix (Coombs, 1995) 
 
In his article, Coombs explains each of the sections of his matrix: 
Faux Pas: An action that an organization deems to be appropriate but some third-party 
challenges. The main cause for these crises is ambiguity. Favors minimal organizational 
responsibility.  
Accidents: Occur in normal organizational operations. These can include natural 
disasters, product defects, and workplace injuries. As they are unintentional, 
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organizational responsibility is seen as minimal, especially when it’s considered a force 
of nature. 
Transgressions: Taking actions that knowingly place the public at risk. This includes 
selling defective or dangerous materials, violating laws, not honoring rewards for 
customers, withholding information, etc. As it is an intentional action, efforts to minimize 
the impact of the crisis or distance from it are not effective as the organization is viewed 
to have high responsibility.  
Terrorism: Intentional acts of a third-party that are to harm an organization. This can 
include product tampering or even hostage taking. As the attack is from an external force, 
the organization has relatively low responsibility for the crisis and can act as a victim.  
While other scholars have studied and developed theories pertaining to crisis response, 
they provide support and repeat each other. Benoit has offered the theory of image restoration 
which provides goal driven communication as it desires to maintain a positive reputation or 
repair damaged relations, just as SCCT does (Benoit, 1995). He also offers five general strategies 
that mirror that of Coombs. His strategies are categorized as denial, evasion of responsibility, 
reinforcement of good traits, corrective action and mortification (Benoit, 1995; Len-Rios & 
Benoit, 2004). The only difference between Benoit and Coombs is that Benoit has corrective 
action and mortification as separate categories. Coombs combined these as redundant strategies 
and offers the response strategy of suffering which becomes vital in terrorism events.   
Contingency theory was additionally created to develop responses in conflicts with 
stakeholders (Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997). While contingency theory seeks a 
favorable response (like SCCT) it looks at the threat “in terms of situational demands for 
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resources” (Mazzei & Ravazzani, 2015, pg. 3), SCCT examines the reputational threat from the 
crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). 
In the review of literature, many perspectives have been studied to examine the dynamics 
of crisis communication. Weick (1988) and Gephart (1993), have examined the actions of 
employees or those close to the crisis in development of enactment perspectives. Analysis of 
word choice has been examined in studies comparing informative content and identification 
content (Balle, 2008; Barrett, 2002), and content-focused versus value-focused content 
(Aggerholm, 2008). Recent studies have also identified the effect a crisis has on individuals 
(Barrett, 2002; Myer, Conte, & Peterson, 2007; Vinten & Lane, 2002). Kim and Krishna (2017) 
take a long-term public relations approach to crisis communication to offer the advantages of 
bridging and buffering relationships ahead of a crisis to maintain a positive image when a crisis 
hits. 
Influential research of crisis communication that focuses on crisis response and post-
crisis stages have had a very common theme. Prominent names such as Coombs and Benoit 
become repetitive in research with their contributions. Coombs’ research (1995, 2007b) offers 
the most comprehensive approach as it encompasses the dynamics spanning multiple elements of 
research such as emotion (Barrett, 2002; Myer, Conte, & Peterson, 2007; Vinten & Lane, 2002) 
and prior relationship reputation (Kim & Krishna, 2017). Additionally, the work of Coombs is 
the most evolved as his SCCT is an expansion of his attribution theory and crisis type matrix 
(Coombs, 2011; Coombs & Holladay, 2009).  
Each of the theories and contributions listed above provide a basis upon which past cases 
can be evaluated for effectiveness of their responses. Additionally, the literature review provides 
support for the actions outlined in crisis response scenarios. 
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Case Reviews  
 There are multiple cases that can be evaluated for good and bad reasons at low, medium 
and high threat levels. A low threat case poses the least risk to an organization’s reputation. In 
these cases, there is little to no negative reaction by the public, which could include social media 
postings or misdemeanor crimes. Typically, they are actions of an individual that may represent 
an organization rather than the organization as a whole. In 2011, the American Red Cross 
avoided backlash on a rogue tweet that one employee posted to the organization’s account 
instead of her intended personal account. The quick actions of removing the tweet within an 
hour, and posting a humorous reply helped the organization from experiencing any negative 
backlash (Wasserman, 2011). On the opposite side of the spectrum for a low-threat crisis is 
Tinder, the top dating application for millennials. After an article appeared in Vanity Fair 
scrutinizing how the application was damaging how people dated, Tinder responded in a thirty-
tweet tirade attacking the publication. While referencing how Tinder was helping people connect 
in China and North Korea and calling Vanity Fair “fake news” (among many other claims), 
Tinder created a crisis out of something that really wasn’t (Kantrowitz, 2015). While the realistic 
response would have been to ignore the article, Twitter’s backlash caught the attention of many 
users. While not significant enough to drastically affect the popularity of Tinder, it did negatively 
impact the organization’s reputation.  
 In a medium-threat crisis, we start to see the presence of minor damages to a public. 
Often, we see this in cases involving defective products or work place injuries. In 1993, Pepsi 
had to respond to a hoax that syringes were found in cans of their Diet Pepsi product. Confident 
that the claims were false, the company released four videos comprehensively displaying the 
company’s canning process. Additionally, the company was able to show via a surveillance tape 
	 12	
a woman in Colorado placing a syringe into a can behind a store clerk’s back. The aggressive 
response by the company helped to minimize the drop in product sales by only 2% during the 
crisis, which was recovered within a month (Bhasin, 2011). Samsung, on the other hand, 
mismanaged the response to a defective product line. The much-anticipated Galaxy Note 7 phone 
was ultimately discontinued after issues of the device catching fire. The recall ultimately resulted 
in a $17 billion hit to the company’s market value (Mullen & Thompson, 2016). However, what 
really impacted the loss was the company’s failed communication of product safety to the public. 
Jon Gingerich, editor of O’Dwyer’s month magazine, explains “Samsung has thus far still been 
unclear communicating with the public whether the now-discontinued devices were safe to use 
or not, and as a result failed to manage its messaging and stay ahead of the crisis until it was too 
late” (Comcowich, 2017).  
 The high-threat crisis brings the highest threat to an organization’s reputation as it can 
involve serious damages and/ or intentionality of the crisis. Johnson & Johnson for example, 
faced a high-threat crisis when seven deaths in the Chicago area were linked to cyanide-laced 
Tylenol capsules in 1982. The company was quick to pull 31 million bottles from shelves (worth 
$100 million) and stopped all production and advertising of the product. Working with the 
Chicago Police, FBI and FDA, it was revealed that the bottles were tampered with. The response 
from Tylenol was to introduce tamper resistant packaging and a $2.50 coupon to consumers. 
This extensive process proved to the media the company’s concern for the public’s safety and 
commitment to correct the issue. The media in turn portrayed the company in a very positive 
light which helped with Johnson and Johnson’s overall recovery (Bhasin, 2011). More recently, 
Wells Fargo experienced a high-threat crisis when employees intentionally set up 2 million fake 
customer accounts to help meet sales goals. Wells Fargo handled the crisis poorly for three 
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reasons. First, the response from the company was perceived as dishonest by the public. Second, 
the company had difficulty with providing a clear and consistent story. Finally, the company 
didn’t take the matter seriously from the beginning, which angered customers further (Weidlich, 
2016). It took nearly a month before anyone in Wells Fargo was held responsible, which was 
ultimately the CEO, John Stumpf, who resigned in October of 2016.  
To provide a better understanding of how to approach a crisis, three case reviews were 
selected to evaluate the effectiveness of the theories of SCCT, attribution and those provided by 
Coombs. The cases were selected to provide a range of crisis responsibility and organizational 
reputation threat.  
Recent crisis cases pertaining to Iowa State University’s National Organization of the 
Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) and National Young Democrat Socialists of America 
(YDSA) clubs were selected. These cases provide local issues and context while fulfilling desires 
for low and medium threats. This is based on their time portrayed in the media and the overall 
threat being low or medium to each organization. To fulfill the review of a high-threat case, the 
Duke University lacrosse scandal was selected. This case provided one of the highest profile 
cases in college athletics and outlines a real threat that any organization could experience. As the 
case ran in the national media for over a year and contained potential criminal punishment, it 
fulfilled the requirements of a high-threat case.  
The selected cases were evaluated from the perspective of the impacted organization 
(ISU NORML, ISU YDSA, Duke Lacrosse). After establishing the crisis type, according to 
Table 2, news and academic articles were analyzed to determine if their response strategies 
aligned with those in Table 1. Response strategies were then compared to the perceived level of 
threat to the organization’s reputation and level of damage caused to determine the effectiveness 
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of the response. Media involvement and attributes of the case were used to determine the severity 
of reputational threats and damages. 
Case  Crisis Type Threat to 
Organization 
Level of 
Damage 
Media 
Involvement 
Duration of 
Case 
Case 1- Iowa 
State 
NORML 
Terrorism Low Medium Off and On 
(Medium) 
4 years 
Case 2- Iowa 
State YDSA 
Faux Pas Medium Low Short (Low) Few Weeks 
Case 3- Duke 
University 
Lacrosse  
Terrorism High High Consistent 
(High) 
1 year + 
Table 3: Case analysis dynamics 
 
Case 1- Iowa State NORML 
 On June 10, 2013, Iowa State University’s Trademark Licensing office rejected the 
design for the campus’s National Organization of the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) 
shirt. The design of the t-shirt featured the text “NORML ISU” across the front with Cy’s head 
replacing the ‘O’. Across the back was a small marijuana leaf with the phrase “Freedom is 
NormL at ISU (Appendix II, Image 1). The issues for the organization developed as the office 
had revised its guidelines for trademark use by students and organizations in January 2013. 
 Prior to the guideline revision, NORML had shirts approved that had even gained the 
attention of local media. In November 2012, The Des Moines Register featured a photo of one 
design that depicted the Iowa State University mascot, Cy, and a cannabis leaf (Appendix II, 
Image 2). This shirt design triggered a large amount of negative feedback towards the University. 
Based on the timeline, it can be assumed that the guideline revision that occurred a few months 
later was in reaction to this coverage and directed towards the NORML club. The January update 
stated that designs with University marks that would promote use of “dangerous, illegal or 
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unhealthy products, actions or behaviors” and “drugs and drug paraphernalia that are illegal or 
unhealthful” would not be approved (Villa, 2014).  
 NORML’s view of the decision and guideline revisions was that it was an attack on the 
organization’s freedom of speech. The organization eventually countered with a lawsuit against 
Iowa State University in 2014. Nearly four years later, the State of Appeals Board approved 
payment to the student leaders who filed the suit (Paul Gerlich and Erin Furleigh) for $75,000 
each for emotional distress (Gehr, 2018).  The original settlement included an additional 
$193,000 for the fees of Gerlich and Furliegh’s lawyers. In March of 2018, another $598,208 
was approved in attorney fees which will all fall on the Iowa taxpayer (WQAD, 2018). 
 The case brings an interesting perspective as both Iowa State University and NORML 
had to respond to the situation. ISU NORML is a local extension of the national organization and 
had the right to depict their association with the University. In the same trademark guidelines, 
the licensing office states that any university recognized group is allowed to use their name and 
connection to the university, including colors, university name and logo (ISD Editorial Staff, 
2014). In the Daily’s editorial article, the Daily proposes that the university really missed an 
opportunity to stand with their students.  
“The only thing that can be said is that it is clear that the university has chosen their 
public image, which is hopefully strong enough to withstand a few t-shirts promoting 
controversial political activism, over the voice of their students. There will always be 
students who stand behind something that the university will not support. Finding tighter 
and tighter restrictions will only harm the university’s image as one of giving little room 
to encouraging students to find their political voice. 
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The university may have the right to protect their image at all costs, but it leaves a lot up 
in the air for the price of what they could lose in student individualism…”(ISD Editorial 
Staff, 2014). 
 Although the situation presents plenty of material for analysis from the perspective of the 
University, this text is more concerned with that of the student organization, NORML. From the 
viewpoint of NORML, the situation was external, uncontrollable, and had unstable factors as 
outlined by Attribution Theory, and therefore deemed not responsible for the crisis (as seen in 
Table 3). The judgment of locus should be made based on what initially caused the crisis. In this 
case, it was not the creation of the shirt that caused the crisis, but rather the revised guidelines of 
the Trademark Office and the ensuing rejection of proposed artwork. In the majority of crises 
that reach the public concerning student organizations, low crisis responsibility is rare. The 
majority are caused by actions of a group or individual that are not deemed appropriate by the 
public (accidents). Regardless, it was still required for NORML to act on the situation and attack 
the crisis themselves.  
 Looking at the Crisis Type Matrix, the situation that NORML found themselves in was 
one of terrorism, as outlined in Table 3. The University’s intentional actions had direct impact on 
the organization. As we can see, NORML displayed evidence of intimidation (threatened the 
organizational power via lawsuit) and transcendence (making the issue about freedom of speech, 
rather than drug promotion). Ultimately, NORML utilized suffering (most suited for terrorism 
crisis) as the crisis was external to the organization but yet was the result of an intentional action. 
By establishing their role as a victim, and that their freedom of speech was imposed upon, 
NORML allowed the proper leaders of the organization to handle communication with the 
university. This allowed NORML to have a unified message and utilize their resources for the 
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battle. This included an appeals process with the Trademark Licensing Office, an appeal with the 
Vice President of Business and Finance for the university (who oversees the Trademark Office), 
an appeal to the President of the University and the Board of Regents, and extensive legal 
consultation. By framing the issue as a freedom of speech matter, NORML was able to further 
position themselves as the victim by making the topic a first amendment issue, rather than one 
about an illegal drug.   
 Although it was a case that didn’t have a conclusion for nearly four years, NORML 
succeeded based on three points. First, the organization framed the issue appropriately, placing 
themselves as the victim. Second, the organization used minimal voices to express their points to 
the university, media and public, therefore allowing NORML to maintain control of their 
message. Lastly, the organization was able to distance itself accordingly when needed to allow 
the legal process to run its course, despite the University’s appeal to the court’s decision. In the 
end, the Iowa State University NORML chapter was able to print their shirts and focus 
conversation on their initial purpose of drug reform.  
 
Case 2- Iowa State Young Democratic Socialists of America 
 At the end of September 2017, the Iowa State University chapter of the Young 
Democratic Socialists of America (YDSA) got themselves into some hot water after posting two 
messages on their twitter account. The first post came in the early afternoon of September 30 
(Appendix II, Image 3): 
“COMRADES: stay away from needle drugs!! The only dope worth shooting is in the 
oval office rn” 
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Days later, on the afternoon of October 4, the organization had another message 
(Appendix II, Image 4): 
“the left has done a good job radicalizing juggalos, weebs, furries,, #But I will not rest 
until “hXc” stands for hang+Xterminate capitalists” 
 The organization quickly found themselves in crisis mode as people brought the remarks 
to the attention of the University and found their actions being reported on national news. Co-
president of the organization, Apple Amos, stated that the tweets were taken from the national 
Democratic Socialists of America’s account, but both were deleted within a day.  
“[The posting of the tweets] was decided by an individual within our group making that 
decision based off of the national organization,” Amos said in Iowa State Daily article on 
October 23. “The rest of our group came to the conclusion that they were inappropriate” 
(Rambo, 2017). 
 Even though the text didn’t originate from the Iowa State chapter, it was still directly 
linked to them and based on the severity of the tweets, posed a medium level of threat to the 
organization (as illustrated in Table 3). Since the remarks, portions of the organization’s forty-
five members had received death threats. The University stood with the organization claiming 
the remark of “hang+Xterminate capitalists” was protected by the University’s freedom of 
speech (Rambo, 2017). In the same article, Iowa State University Relations Executive Director, 
John McCarroll, clarified the University’s freedom of speech policy pertaining to the situation: 
“As a general matter, speech that rises to the level of discriminatory harassment and/ or 
constitutes a threat to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals on campus is not protected First Amendment speech” (Rambo, 
2017). 
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 With this remark, it showed that while the university defended one of the tweets as 
freedom of speech, the tweet posing a threat to the President of the United States was not. The 
organization’s remark of “the only dope worth shooting is in the oval office” did grab the 
attention of the U.S. Secret Service.  
 While during the case, many of YDSA’s opposition was quick to make comments, the 
organization held with the voice of Amos for local media and made no comment to national 
outlets. While many blogs have written about it in a more copy and paste fashion, the main 
national outlet to cover the story was Fox News. Generally speaking, the student organization did 
a good job to minimize the exposure of the story. In addition, Amos and the organization took 
proper course of action by meeting with the University’s Equal Opportunity Office and the U.S. 
Secret Service.  
 When considering Coombs’ Crisis Type Matrix, this case should be seen as a faux pas. 
When the individual member made the tweets, it was taken from the parent organization’s 
account, therefore associated with the Iowa State University’s chapter’s beliefs. While it was 
later expressed that not all members found the statements to be appropriate, the cause of the 
crisis was from the public’s reaction. According to Coombs’ Crisis Response Strategy, in their 
situation of a faux pas, there is no denying that the evidence was true and that YDSA would not 
be able to play a victim card in the matter. The main ambiguity comes from the decision whether 
the organization’s performance history was generally seen as positive or negative in the public 
eye.  
 As it is an organization that portrays a very strong political viewpoint, there will be 
publics that associate with both sides of the YDSA’s performance history. In the case of this 
crisis, however, the most vocal public could be those that oppose the organization and likely see 
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their performance as negative. This suggests the organization takes the path of mortification, 
which they in fact did. As mortification is an attempt to win forgiveness in order to lessen 
negative feelings toward the organization, an apology is required. While some seek forgiveness 
in terms of compensation, repentance simply asks for forgiveness and for people to accept the 
organization’s actions (Coombs, 1995). YDSA achieved this in their public statements and the 
action of removing the tweets. In addition, their actions with University and Federal personnel 
further supports that they took ownership of their actions and wished to move in a direction to 
ask for the public’s forgiveness. The combination of these actions allowed YDSA to quickly 
disappear from media attention, as shown in Table 3. As this case is relatively young, the 
important steps for YDSA is to be cautious of their social media actions in the future and be 
mindful of any additional conversation or meeting requests that pertain to the event. The 
organization does not want to take any action that would minimize their attempts to ask for 
forgiveness on this case and remind the community of their recent error.  
 
Case 3- Duke University Men’s Lacrosse Team 
In the middle of spring break 2006, the Duke lacrosse team was on campus in Durham, 
North Carolina, conducting their regularly scheduled practices. Being one of the few on campus, 
the team decided to host a party for themselves on the evening of March 13 where they hired two 
female exotic dancers. This night would be the beginning of a very complex and high-profile 
case, as illustrated in Table 3. The next day, one of the dancers contacted the police to tell them 
she had been sexually assaulted by three of the players. The case grew, gaining national attention 
and even its own ESPN 30 for 30 special titled Fantastic Lies.  
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 “It was such a horrific situation that had all of these factors that made it particularly 
explosive,” said columnist Ruth Sheehan of the Durham, NC News & Observer in the ESPN 
feature. “Race, and class, and City of Durham versus university, and town-gown kind of stuff. It 
was this Molotov cocktail that landed in the community.” (ESPN, 2016) 
 The case did have many dimensions and perspectives as people from every public and 
demographic stepped out to speak on the injustices they had heard. Over the course of the 
fourteen-month long case, the University, team members and their families experienced a roller 
coaster of emotions. Fliers were distributed around the community that had the pictures and 
names of the team members (Appendix II, Image 5). In a matter of days, protests were staged on 
campus, in the community and even on the front lawn of the lacrosse house, demanding the 
players be held responsible for their actions. A timeline of events of the case is outlined in 
Appendix III (Duke, 2006; Associated Press, 2007; ESPN, 2016). 
As the timeline shows, it took the University ten days to publicly respond to the crisis. It 
wasn’t until two weeks after the incident that a statement was finally made by Duke or the team 
that stated the team’s innocence in the case. By this time, protests had already begun and the 
people of the Durham and Duke communities had already formed their opinion. While this 
response did come before the story became national front-page news, the university really missed 
an opportunity to get ahead by addressing the local media from the beginning. This is important 
as national media turns to the local outlets due for their knowledge of the local environment 
(Martin, 1988). In the ESPN documentary, one mother recalled that in the early days of the case 
the players were not to tell anyone, including their parents, of the situation in hopes that it would 
blow over and that nothing had really happened. William Chafe, professor of history at Duke, 
also noted in the film that leading administrators of the University were not told about the case 
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for nearly ten days (ESPN, 2016). After these initial statements were made, communication from 
the University was minimal as they attempted to distance themselves from the case and allow the 
legal process to take over. 
“From the beginning, President Brodhead abdicated his responsibility as Duke’s leader to 
stand up for fairness and truth,” Duke graduate and lawyer Jay Bilas wrote to the editor of Duke 
Magazine. “[He] should resign or be dismissed.” These words however were never read by 
public eyes as the editor was given instruction by the university not to publish the note (ESPN, 
2016). 
In addition to the lack of a timely response by the University, communication failed to be 
consistent through those that were supporting the lacrosse team. Before the first statements from 
the University were heard, actions on March 23 DNA submissions by the players increased the 
public’s perception that the players were guilty (Appendix II, Image 6). Investigative reporter for 
the Durham News and Observer, Joseph Neff, recalls in the documentary that a lawyer of the 
players told them to cover their faces as they entered the police station knowing reporters were 
there (ESPN, 2016). These masked images, partnered with the team’s current actions of 
solidarity and silence, seemed to support that the players had in fact committed the crime. 
The actions of President Bordhead, when he did address the public, was well calculated 
despite the lack of timing. Bordhead effectively identified his key stakeholders in the case 
(alumni, parents of students, and the Duke community) and addressed them in specific action. By 
providing a dedicated website for more information, he also provided the perception of urgency 
of the case and transparency of information. He framed the situation to be impactful on a larger 
scale as it is was an opportunity for Duke to be a leader in addressing the national issue of sexual 
assaults (Fortunato, 2008).  
	 23	
As SCCT shows, two of the major factors that play a role in the crisis responsibility are 
emotion and prior relationship reputation. Given Sheehan’s factors of the local climate at the 
time, it is evident that emotions were very high for those in the surrounding communities. James 
Coleman Jr., professor of Criminal Law at Duke notes in the ESPN production that the crisis 
gave a platform for the general public to push other issues they felt they could connect to it. As 
far as prior reputation was concerned, the team was not viewed in a positive light. While some 
were fans of theirs due to their party mentality, the case was seen by some as a final straw given 
the team’s history of prior arrests for drunken behavior.  
In Coombs’ Crisis Type Matrix, the Duke lacrosse scandal could be classified as an 
accident or terrorism. The situation can be viewed as an accident as it was unintentional and 
internal to Duke. However, as the crisis was ultimately the result of the false claims by an 
external party, it could be viewed as a terrorism case. In the case of the response, the claims were 
not known to be false publicly until the conclusion, therefore not allowing Duke or the lacrosse 
players the opportunity to be seen as victims. Had Duke taken the path of a response to terrorism 
based on false evidence, they would have expressed responses of nonexistence and clarification 
(Coombs, 1995). 
 The closest resemblance to this strategy is Brodhead’s reminders that the players were 
innocent until proven guilty. As it was nearly impossible for Duke to publicly prove the claims to 
be false, this was the extent they could handle the crisis as one of terrorism. As Fortunato 
mentions in previous research, Duke did utilize the strategies of mortification (repentance and 
rectification specifically), transcendence (by making it an opportunity to solve a larger problem), 
bolstering (reminding of all the good the university has done), and distance strategy 
(acknowledge the issue). According to Coombs’ response strategy, only the legal team exhibited 
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the correct response. As the evidence was false, and the organization maintained a relatively poor 
performance history, clarification (explaining there was no crisis) would have been the ideal 
response. That, however, could have created more damage to the team’s public image during the 
crisis. The legal teams were able to use clarification by using evidence to prove there was no 
opportunity for a crime to be committed given the timeline. While the mortification responses 
are typically associated with true evidence of a crisis involving major damages and an 
organization with a poor history, it was likely the best reactive strategy for the University to take.  
While the players were eventually found innocent and the team returned to normal 
competition in the end, the University failed on the opportunity to combat the issue early. As 
Fortunato mentions, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of a public relations plan in a 
crisis setting. With using the support of Martin’s claims, by engaging with the local media earlier 
in the case, the University and lacrosse team could have gotten their message out sooner, 
ultimately helping the uphill fight that they faced. Regardless, the false claims still impact the 
organizations and the players to this day. 
“Not a month goes by when I am not reminded of the damages those accusations have 
had on my reputation and the public’s perception of my character. Sometimes only time can heal 
wounds,” said an anonymous player during the documentary (ESPN, 2016). 
 
Case Review Summary 
 From the above we can gather characteristics of successful crisis responses. As was clear 
in Case 1 and Case 2, the organizations had one spokesperson speaking on their behalf. This 
ensured the message was consistent and contained. In the larger Case 3, when multiple people 
were handling and communicating the case, desired actions and messages were altered. In Case 
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3, this was evident with the players coming in to the police station with the shirts over their 
heads. However, due to the extent of that case, Duke was able to utilize different voices to 
establish a change in framing/response strategy. When the case moved from the University to the 
legal teams, they were able to change their approach more to one of nonexistence.  
 A second characteristic we can see is the use of the media in the cases. In Case 1 and 
Case 2 timely responses to the media helped the organization frame the public’s interpretation of 
the crisis. In Case 3 Duke clearly takes a long time to respond to the events and lost an 
opportunity to help frame the crisis. While Case 3 and similarly Case 1 required extensive media 
attention and involvement, Case 2 effectively framed their messages to bring closure to the 
situation and allowed the media and general public to move on from the event.  
 Case 1 and Case 2 shared a theme of Freedom of Speech issues. This allowed the 
organizations to utilize the response strategies of suffering and mortification, given the 
classification of the type of crisis each organization was experiencing. In the eyes of the 
impacted student organizations, the damages in these cases were minimal, if at all. The cases 
easily qualified as low and medium threats. In contrast, with the presence of emotion in Case 3, 
Coombs SCCT model shows the close connection it can have with the crisis responsibility 
(Coombs, 2007b). This, paired with a larger victim public (Duke University and the City of 
Durham), not only created a more complex case, but one that fit the definition of high-level 
threat. 
 
Crisis Response Recommendations 
 The following outlines three scenarios that organizations may face with varying levels of 
crisis responsibility and threat to an organization’s reputation. The following outlines can be 
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used as consideration when dealing with a low, medium or high crisis threat. The factors that 
categorize the three levels are the organization’s perceived responsibility to the crisis and the 
threat to their organizational reputation. In the outline, factors such as use of media, validity of 
evidence, publics’ consideration and response strategy are discussed. Following each case is a 
flow chart to better assist in determining the best response strategy for a crisis. 
 Before examining the threat levels, there are some guidelines that apply for each case. 
First, in any crisis, an organization must determine if the evidence in the case is true or false. If 
the evidence is false, the organization has an opportunity to utilize nonexistence or clarification 
strategies based on their performance history (reputation). If the evidence is false, the 
organization must be absolutely certain that they have conclusive proof thereof. It is the 
responsibility of the organization to adequately convey that inform to the public. If the 
organization is not able to ensure that they can communicate the validity of the evidence as false, 
clarification and nonexistence strategies can harm the organizations reputation during the crisis, 
especially in medium and high threat scenarios. This is because stakeholders may see that the 
organization simply does not care or is unwilling to accept that there is a mistake.  
 Second, depending on the crisis type, the acknowledgment of publics comes into 
consideration. While some crisis responses can use the same strategy for multiple publics, others 
require different framing (as outlined in each case below). The public evaluation allows the 
organization to identify two main stakeholders that require responses. The first is the victim 
cluster that contains those impacted by the damages. The second is the non-victim cluster which 
is the rest of the general public that can be following the case for various reasons. When the 
consideration for publics is seen in the flow charts below, a response strategy should be selected 
for each public. 
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Case Threat 
Level 
Crisis Type Threat to 
Organization 
Level of 
Damage 
Media 
Involvement 
Duration of 
Case 
Examples 
Low Threat Faux pas/ 
Accident 
Low Low Low if any Approximately 
1 week 
Social media postings 
Misdemeanor arrests 
Medium 
Threat 
Accident Medium Low-
Medium 
Short (Low) Few weeks Workplace Accidents 
Defective products 
 
High 
Threat 
Accident/ 
Terrorism/ 
Transgression 
High High Consistent 
(High) 
1 year or more Events resulting in 
injury or death 
Criminal charges 
Table 4: Crisis Threat Level Factors 
 
Low Threat 
 On college campuses, low threat crisis is the most common type of crisis. While these 
crises may not always become public knowledge, action and considerations must still be 
evaluated. In a low threat crisis, the organization’s link to the crisis may be low and/or possess 
little threat to the organization’s reputation. A low threat crisis can be a member being arrested 
for public intoxication or an inappropriate social media posting. The low threat crisis does not 
cause a form of damage to others (physical, financial, etc.) and attracts low media attention, if 
any. If it does gain media attention, it stays local and is usually covered for a week or less. The 
above Case 2 would have been a low threat scenario, had it not gained national news coverage. 
Based on the media coverage and severity of the claims made by the organization, it elevated the 
case to a medium threat. While considering Coombs’ crisis matrix, the events are considered to 
be unintentional by nature, leaving the crisis as a faux pas or an accident. In the low threat 
scenario, factors of the situation crisis communication theory model (like emotion and crisis 
history) have little impact on the response and behavioral intentions. While certain publics may 
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acknowledge the events, there is relatively low involvement on their part to evaluate the crisis 
dimensions.  
 According to Coombs, those experiencing a faux pas really have three decisions to make. 
First, the organization can claim there is no crisis (nonexistence strategy). This can be achieved 
by eliminating the link between the organization and discussed event. This is mainly effective if 
the evidence of the case is either ambiguous or false claims (ie. rumors). Second, if the evidence 
of the crisis is true, the organization can seek to gain the public’s acceptance in a number of 
ways. If the organization has a positive reputation with the affected public, the organization can 
make attempts to use either distance or ingratiation strategies. By either helping the public to 
gain acceptance of the crisis, or by placing the organization in a positive light (perhaps by using 
past actions of the organization), organizations can minimize the negative impacts of a crisis in a 
faux pas situation. Finally, if the organization is perceived to have a negative reputation, the best 
course of action is to seek forgiveness with the mortification strategy. By offering an apology or 
seeking forgiveness, the organization can achieve a quick resolution to the situation and ideally 
move on with little negative impact. 
 As in the faux pas situation, an organization can use nonexistence or clarification strategy 
in an accident situation if the evidence is false. Nonexistence or clarification can be used once 
again if the organization’s performance history is positive or negative respectively. If the 
evidence is true, the next biggest factor in selecting a response strategy is the severity of the 
damages that have occurred. As this is a low-threat situation, damages can be assumed to be 
minor, in which case a distance strategy is most widely accepted. This is effective as it 
recognizes that there is a crisis but seeks to gain the public’s acceptance in an effort to move 
forward. This strategy is acceptable regardless of what the public’s perception of the 
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organization might be. If the perception is deemed to be positive, the organization may also 
utilize the strategy of ingratiation. As there are likely past positive actions by the organization, 
they can use this history to help improve their public image during the accident.  
 An organization must carefully consider the use of the media during the event. As 
examined in the Case 3, the media (especially at the local level) can play a crucial role in the 
response and image restoration process. However, in the case of a low-threat crisis, going to the 
media with a statement may give the perception that the crisis is bigger than it really is. Ideally, 
the organization does not want the issue to appear in the media at all. If it does, the quicker it 
disappears, the better. Therefore, the organization must closely monitor the media to see if the 
situation does gain attention. At that point and time, the organization may respond with the 
appropriate strategies. At the first indication of the crisis, the organization can start to prepare 
their response so they can react in a timely matter. This will help the organization maintain 
control of the overall case, unlike what was seen at the beginning of Case 3. 
 By offering an appropriately outlined strategy response from above, an organization can 
expect to effectively handle a low-threat crisis. An organization must remember to react in a 
timely manner if it is determined to react at all. As the situation will ideally be forgotten in a 
short matter of time, there is no necessity to develop an extensive communication plan. By 
maintaining a continuous evaluation of the organization’s public image among stakeholders, it 
will provide a quicker and more precise response to a given situation. Based on the information 
above, the flow chart below can be used to help evaluate the post-response strategies for a low 
threat crisis.  
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Chart 1: Low threat crisis decision chart 
 
Medium Threat 
 There are two main differences distinguishing a low-threat from a medium-threat 
scenario. The first is the amount of attention the case receives in the media. As evaluated in Case 
2 above, the YDSA claims received not only national media attention, but also the attention of 
national organizations (Secret Service). Based on the extent of the coverage and severity of 
statements, this case is perceived to be a medium threat to the organization. The second major 
difference is at this level we start to see the introduction of damages to specific publics being 
introduced. While the damages are not major, they amplify the potential organization’s 
reputational threat. These medium threat crises are the majority of cases that appear in the media. 
Additionally, medium threats have the most variety of causes. These cases can include situations 
involving the arrests of individuals, remarks made publicly either on a social media platform, in 
Evidence	Validity Crisis	Type Addressed	Public Organization	History Response	Strategy
Negative Mortification
Accident Positive
Distance/	
Ingratiation
True Victim Negative	 Mortifiaction
Positive Ingratiation
Faux	Pas Negative Mortification
Non	Victim
Positive
Distance/	
Ingratiation
Low	Threat	
Crisis
Negative Clarification
False Positive Nonexistence
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person, or to the media, workplace accidents leading to injury, and defective products to provide 
a few examples.  
While there is a wide variety of medium threat examples, they are most commonly 
viewed as accidents. This is due to the fact that had the actions leading to the crisis been deemed 
intentional (resulting in a transgression or terrorism type of crisis), the threat to the 
organizational reputation is drastically intensified, making it a high-threat case. While a faux pas 
is an unintentional type of crisis, the involvement of damages associated with the medium-threat 
makes accident the only crisis type. 
 As we see in all types of crisis, if the evidence is false and there is an ability to easily 
demonstrate that to the public, nonexistence and clarification strategies are ideal. If the evidence 
is true, the next evaluation in the situation of an accident is to determine the severity of damage. 
Typically, in medium-threat situations, damages will not be major. The use of distance strategies 
(such as excuses and justification) is appropriate in these events of minor damage (Coombs 
1995). As damages become more severe, people seek to hold someone accountable for the crisis, 
therefore holding a larger threat to the organization’s reputation (Griffin, 1994).  
After the evaluation of damages, Coombs suggests the consideration of the two publics 
the organization will have to address (those impacted by the crisis known as the victims, and 
those following the crisis known as the non-victims). When considering the response to the 
victims, we start to see the influence of the emotion dynamic of the SCCT model. In the case of 
minor damage accidents, victim status is not impactful on the response strategy as distance 
strategies are still most acceptable. As mentioned in the low threat case, an organizational 
performance history can provide additional responses to utilize, if the history is positive. Positive 
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history can provide the organization more credibility to use the ingratiation approach and 
therefore lessening their reputational threat (Coombs, 1995). 
 In this situation, the use of media must be more strongly factored. As the situation 
considers the impact of damages, it is highly likely that the crisis will appear in the media. A 
timely and appropriate response to the media is crucial as the public’s views of the crisis are tied 
to the local outlets, and often the local media defines the severity of the issue (Coombs,1995). As 
we saw in Case 1 and Case 2, having one spokesperson for the crisis ensures that the message 
stays consistent and contained. Special consideration should be given to the publics that are 
following the case. Those impacted by the case (known as the victims) are one public that will be 
following the case and seeking that the organization takes responsibility. In a medium threat 
situation, the affected public wants a form of mortification, commonly repentance, to bring 
closure to their case. Non-victim publics seek a ramification that the organization has taken 
actions that will ideally prevent a future crisis (Combs, 1995).  
While the media can be an asset, it is important to understand the time frame of the case. 
The goal of the organization in this case should be to move the attention of the public and media 
on from the crisis as soon as possible. By monitoring the public’s perception of the case, the 
organization can gain an understanding of when society is accepting forgiveness and able to 
bring it to closure. When this occurs, the organization should seek to distance itself from the 
media to help with the process. By staying visible, publics that are ready to move on may think 
there is more to the case and negatively prolong the timeline. 
Using appropriate frames and timely actions, an organization may be able to reduce a 
medium threat to a low threat with the help of the media. The following flow chart outlines the 
response strategy process in a medium threat crisis based on the information provided above. 
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Chart 2: Medium threat crisis decision chart 
 
High Threat 
 The high threat scenario possesses the biggest threat of damage to the organization’s 
reputation. In this scenario, major damages have occurred that require careful consideration and 
strategic communication. This can include situations with loss of life or criminal charges (as seen 
in Case 3). It is assumed that the crisis is identified by the media as a high-profile case. 
Reactions to the situation require careful planning while considering the interest of a timely 
message. A carefully worded response is critical given the amount of coverage the media will 
provide, ultimately impacting the public’s perception of the crisis. 
 Unlike other scenarios, a high threat crisis has no limitation of intentional versus 
unintentional or internal versus external dynamics. The main determining factor in the high 
threat situation is the potential presence of major damage. In responses, the organization must be 
Evidence	Validity Addressed	Public Organization	History Response	Strategy
True Victim Negative	 Mortifiaction
Positive Ingratiation
Negative Mortification
Non	Victim
Positive
Distance/	
Ingratiation
Medium	
Threat	Crisis
Negative Clarification
False Positive Nonexistence
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mindful to atone for the actions and the results from it and prevent actions that would further 
upset any publics (Coombs, 1995). Major damages can be found in the accident, transgression 
and terrorism styles.  
In accident and transgression style crises, when the evidence is true, mortification is the 
most practical response as it seeks forgiveness while claiming responsibility. This may be 
achieved either with compensation (remediation), offering an apology (repentance), taking action 
to prevent the crisis from reoccurring (rectification), or any combination of the three. In an 
accident scenario, when addressing a public that is a non-victim, excuse strategy may be used as 
the damages are less personal. By attempting to minimize the responsibility, the organization 
may be able to downplay the threat level to medium in the non-victim public’s eyes. As the 
transgression style is deemed to be intentional, an organization must stick with mortification 
despite the public being addressed. Similar to the minor damage scenario in both styles, the 
organization can utilize positive performance history in the response with ingratiation to 
maintain a positive reputation. This should be used in addition to the other selected response 
strategies (mortification or excuse).  
While a terrorism style of crisis is still deemed to be intentional, it is a unique situation 
that can leave an opportunity for the organization to claim victimization. If the evidence is 
deemed true, the organization can utilize the suffering strategy regardless of the public being 
addressed. The goal of this strategy is to win the sympathy of the audience moving forward in 
the crisis. As the crisis contains major damages, mortification strategy should also be used as it 
shows compassion by the organization to the situation. With mortification and sympathy 
partnered together, the organization can drastically improve their reputation. Finally, as in the 
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other scenarios, if the organization has a positive performance history, it can use ingratiation 
techniques to further minimize its linkage to the crisis.  
As in the other examples, if the evidence is false in any of the crises types, response 
strategy is either nonexistence or clarification, dependent on the organization’s performance 
history. 
In a high threat case, it can be presumed that the case will stay in the news for an 
extended period of time. This can be consistent or spread out with extended interruptions in 
coverage. As it can be an extensive process, it is important for the organization to keep record of 
what has been said during the case. This will help to ensure that the message stays consistent. 
This can further be achieved by minimizing the amount of people that speak on behalf of the 
group. However, as noted in Case 3 there is an opportunity to utilize a new speaker on behalf of 
the organization. When Duke had someone new speak on behalf of the lacrosse team, the 
strategy that they used also changed. While Brodhead was able to utilize mortification, the legal 
team was able to utilize suffering.  
By also closely monitoring the media, the organization can determine how the public is 
viewing the organization during the crisis, and therefore, allowing the organization to frame their 
responses appropriately. As mentioned in the low threat case, use of the media can be critical to 
the publics’ perception of the organization during the case. However, appearing in the media too 
often can make messages seem ambiguous and even unnecessarily amplify the severity of the 
threat.  
When formulating a response to a major crisis, it is also important to consider the 
emotions that are at play both within the organization and of the public. As we can see in the 
SCCT model, crisis responsibility can impact behavioral intentions through emotions and 
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organizational reputation. While reputation and emotions are very closely related, it is due to the 
connections they have with the crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007b). Responses that are 
developed based upon emotion can at times ignore the impact on an organizational reputation. 
Additionally, other factors of the SCCT model play a larger role in the response process. Unlike 
the low and medium threat scenarios, the high threat can assume a higher level of evaluation by 
the public. This means that the organization must additionally factor in the history of the crisis 
when developing a response. As mentioned above, this is where mortification (more specifically 
rectification) plays a large role to communicate to the public the crisis will not reoccur.  
With the proper utilization of the media and appropriately framed messages, an 
organization can successfully move through a high-threat level of crisis. The flow chart below 
offers a reference for organizations to select the most appropriate response strategy in a high-
threat crisis. 
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Chart 3: High threat crisis decision chart 
 
Conclusion 
 Going through a crisis response can be scary and challenging for student organizations. 
There are many response strategies that can be selected to address a crisis situation and help an 
organization attempt to positively repair its image. As the above charts (1, 2, and 3) show, there 
are many factors to consider before selecting an appropriate path forward. During each process, 
there are additional factors to consider such as the use of the media, the impacted stakeholders, 
and those outlined by SCCT. 
Evidence	Validity Crisis	Type Addressed	Public Organization	History Response	Strategy
Negative
Suffering/	
Mortification
Terrorism Positive
Suffering/	
Mortification
/	Ingratiation
True Victim Negative	 Mortifiaction
Accident
Positive
Ingratiation/	
Mortification
Negative Mortification
Non	Victim
Positive
Excuse/	
Ingratiation
High	Threat	
Crisis
Transgression Negative Mortification
Positive
Mortification
/	Ingratiation
Negative Clarification
False Positive Nonexistence
	 38	
 When reviewing Charts 1, 2 and 3, there are a few similarities and differences among 
each. The first similarity among the three charts is the consistent decision process when 
responding to false evidence. First, in all three charts, we see the recommendation of either 
nonexistence or clarification strategies based upon the organization’s performance history. This 
is attributed to the fact that nonexistence strategies are the only ones that claim that no crisis has 
occurred. While distance strategy is similar, it acknowledges the crisis and seeks to weaken 
association by gaining the public’s acceptance. Second, we see the connection between 
mortification strategy and the negative performance history. While the high-threat scenario uses 
mortification in all responses, we see its association with negative performance specifically in 
the low and medium threat scenarios. This is attributed to the goal of mortification to seek 
forgiveness. When the organization has a poor history, accepting the occurrence of the crisis and 
offering forgiveness in the form of compensation, apology or assurance that the crisis will not 
repeat is a strategy to improve its overall reputation. The main difference that we see between the 
three charts is the complexity of crisis types. In comparison, Chart 2 has the easiest decision-
making flow. This is because in the medium-threat crisis, only an accidental type of crisis can 
occur. Chart 3, however, can be the most complicated as it has three crises types evident with 
accident, transgression, and terrorism all being potential. Chart 1 falls in between Chart 2 and 
Chart 3 as the decision between two crisis types exists (faux pas and accident).  
 The above text, defined a crisis as an event which requires action and a strategic 
response. These events (crises) threaten the public’s impression of an organization or individual. 
This posed another limitation. By definition of the text, ISU NORML and ISU YDSA 
experienced a crisis that required strategic communication. However, this definition was not 
accepted by everyone. In communications with Iowa State University Relation’s Office for more 
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information on the campus incidents, they did not classify the cases as crises. Executive Director 
of University Relations, John McCarroll, defined a crisis as “a situation that negatively affects an 
organization, business or institution’s reputation/ brand over a long period of time. It may result 
in serious financial losses, lack of investor confidence, or in our case, lack of support from 
alumni and friends” (personal communication, April 11, 2018). However, even by the definition 
of McCarroll, it could be argued that the cases are classified as crises as they threatened negative 
effects to the organization. Regardless, the text was not able to receive supporting evidence from 
University offices.  
 This study has attempted to provide a clear framework for how to select appropriate 
responses based on low, medium and high threat situations. While this is one of the first and 
most impactful steps in a crisis response, it is not the only one. This study utilized media articles 
and academic research journals to provide a theory-based approach to selecting a response. As 
this approach provides deep consideration and evaluation of the public’s perception to the 
organization in the response process, it is limited in considering the internal perspectives during 
the situation. Further studies can examine the experience from a more internal perspective. 
Additional further studies could evaluate the optimal usage of the media at each threat level or 
how to evaluate the crisis once it is deemed to be over.  
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Appendix I Crisis Response Strategies Explained 
Strategy Definition 
Nonexistence Looks to dismiss the crisis by arguing that the crisis does not exist. 
This can be achieved by showing there is no link between the 
“fictitious crisis” and the organization. 
     Denial Simply stating nothing happened. 
     Clarification Seeks to explain why there is no crisis or why it is not true. 
     Attack Aggressive strategy that confronts those who suggest there is a 
crisis. This could be an against media that are claiming the crisis. 
     Intimidation Most aggressive nonexistence as it threatens with power (threat of 
lawsuits or violence). 
Distance Recognizes there is a crisis and attempts to gain public acceptance. 
By ultimately seeking to weaken the association of the crisis with 
the organization, the threat to the organization’s reputation 
decreases. 
     Excuse Efforts to minimize the organizations responsibility be denial of 
intention or volition. 
Denial of 
intention 
Minimizing responsibility as it was unintentional 
Denial of volition Minimizing responsibility by not being at fault. Typically done by 
scapegoating. 
     Justification Seeks to minimize the damage associated with the crisis by 
displaying the crisis as not as bad as similar crises.  
Minimizing 
Injury 
Denying of serious injury or damages. 
Victim Deserving Victims deserved what happened. 
Misrepresentation 
of the crisis event 
Actual events are different than what is being portrayed by media 
or other publics. 
Ingratiation Looks to gain the approval by placing the organization in a 
positive light. 
     Bolstering Reminds society of the organizations past positive work such as 
philanthropic efforts. 
     Transcendence Places the crisis on a larger scale. It intends that the public will by 
lead away from the specific reasons of the crisis as they consider 
the larger picture. Example: Duke claiming the lacrosse scandal 
was an opportunity to search for a solution to the ongoing national 
sexual assault issues. 
     Praising Others Praising a particular group or public in efforts to gain their 
approval. 
Mortification  Seeks to earn forgiveness and acceptance of the crisis. 
     Remediation Asks for forgiveness by awarding compensation for damages. 
     Repentance Offering an apology in hopes of forgiveness. 
     Rectification Taking action to prevent the crisis from reoccurring. 
Suffering Claiming to be the victim in the crisis to win sympathy. 
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Appendix II Images 
 
Image 1: Shirts of NORML ISU that were rejected by Iowa State University leading to the 
lawsuit of freedom of speech infringement. (credit leafly.com) 
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Image 2: NORML Shirt that appeared in the Des Moines Register sparking the revisions to the 
trademark office guidelines. (Credit to Iowa State Daily). 
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Image 3: The first tweet by YDSA that gained the attention of the Secret Service (credit to 
Campus Reform). 
 
 
Image 4: The second tweet by YDSA that Iowa State University claimed was protected by 
Freedom of Speech (credit to Campus Reform). 
 
	 48	
 
 
Image 5: Flyer that circulated the Duke and Durham communities containing the names and 
faces of the Duke Lacrosse players. 
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Image 6: Duke Lacrosse players walk into a local police station to provide their DNA in the case. 
The covered faces (suggested by an attorney as the media was present) help to frame that the 
players were guilty in the publics eyes. (Credit to VanceHolmes.com). 
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Appendix III Timeline of Duke Lacrosse Scandal 
(Associated Press, 2007; Duke, 2006; ESPN, 2016). 
2006 
March 13- The Duke Lacrosse team has a party at their team house where they hire two 
strippers. 
March 14- One of the dancers, Crystal Mangum, tells Durham police that she was 
sexually assaulted in a very gruesome manner.  
March 23- Forty-six team members report to Durham police to be photographed and 
provide DNA samples. 
March 24- The first statement by Duke is issued by Senior VP for Public Affairs and 
Government Relations, John F. Burness, saying the University and players are monitoring 
situation and cooperating.  
March 25- Duke University cancels (forfeits) two lacrosse games as a form of 
punishment for the ill-advised party. Duke President, Richard H. Bordhead urges the 
team is cooperating with police and states that the players are innocent until proven 
guilty.  
March 28- The captains of the team issue a statement denying all allegations. The season 
is suspended until further notice. At a press conference, Bordhead says the team denies 
sex “of any kind” occurred. Durham D.A. Mike Nifong says the nurses who conducted 
rape kit observed vaginal trauma. 
March 29- Story makes the front page of the New York Times. Materials are distributed 
around campus by protesters that included photos and names of the team members. 
March 30- Brodhead sends e-mail to Duke alumni and parents explaining the situation 
and directing them to a website specific to the case for more information.  
April 4- Mangum identifies two of her attackers in a photo lineup. It is later deemed to be 
an irregular process as only pictures of the lacrosse players were shown to Mangum and 
no fake IDs as per normal procedure. 
April 5- Brodhead in a letter to the Duke community, alumni and parents says the 
incident has brought issues of race, gender, opportunity, privilege, and inequality to the 
forefront. He announces the formation of committees to investigate the situation and 
current climate of the University. Brodhead cancels the remainder of the lacrosse season 
and allegedly forces the team’s Head Coach, Mike Pressler to resign.  
April 10- Lawyers for the lacrosse players announce there was no match in the DNA 
tests. 
April 14- Defense attorneys share “photo timeline” that proves no rape could have 
occurred in Mangum’s claims. 
April 18- Reade Seligmann and Collin Finnerty are arrested and charged with rape, 
sexual offense and kidnapping as a result of Mangum’s identificaton. They are released 
on bond. 
April 19- Attorney for Seligmann releases time-stamped photos of phone records, 
DukeCard swipe records of building entry, and receipts of fast-food and ATM stops that 
shows he could not have committed any crime. 
May 12- Nifong takes DNA samples to a private company for a second round of testing. 
Company reported that a false fingernail of Mangum’s contains DNA that represents 2% 
of the male population including 2006 graduate and former captain David Evans. 
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May 15- Evans is charged with the same crimes as Seligmann and Finnerty. Evans makes 
a public statement that everyone has been told some “fantastic lies,” and proclaims his 
innocence. 
Dec 15- Brian Meehan, director of the private DNA testing lab, testifies that he had an 
agreement with Nifong to withhold information from the May 12 report making it 
incomplete.  
Dec 22- Nifong drops the charges of rape against all the players as Mangum now tells 
investigators a different story saying she was no longer sure about some aspects of her 
original story. Kidnapping and sexual offense charges are still pending on all three. 
Dec 28- North Carolina bar files ethics charges against Nifong for his actions in the case. 
(The bar would file a second round of charges against him on Jan 24, 2007. These 
charges would ultimately lead to Nifong’s disbarment on June 16, 2007.) 
2007 
Jan 12- Nifong sends a request to North Carolina Attorney General, Roy Cooper, asking 
to be taken off the case. The next day Cooper announces his office would take over. 
April 12- Cooper declares Seligmann, Finnerty, and Evans innocent of all charges. 
